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ABSTRACT 
We call those gestures “instrumental” that can enhance certain thinking 
processes of an agent by offering him representational models of his 
actions in a virtual space of imaginary performative possibilities. We argue 
that pointing is an instrumental gesture in that it represents geometrical 
information on one’s own gaze direction (i.e., a spatial model for 
attentional/ocular fixation/orientation), and provides a ritualized 
template for initiating gaze coordination and joint attention. We counter 
two possible objections, asserting respectively that the representational 
content of pointing is not constitutive, but derived from language, and that 
pointing directly solicits gaze coordination, without representing it. We 
consider two studies suggesting that attention and spatial perception are 
actively modified by one’s own pointing activity: the first study shows that 
pointing gestures help children link sets of objects to their corresponding 
number words; the second, that adults are faster and more accurate in 
counting when they point. 
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1. Gestures facilitate cognitive tasks 
We abundantly use gestures outside the communicative context, when nobody 
can see us performing them, and even when they don’t have any directly 
manipulative/transformational scope. This is importantly true of finger 
pointing too, as the use of this gesture is not confined to communication. Why 
do we produce gestures in general, then, and pointing in particular? Some 
influential trends in psycholinguistics and philosophy of mind contend that 
hand gestures are not just the final motor byproduct of cognitive processing, or 
a supplementary aid to communication, but can also intervene to facilitate 
some cognitive tasks, soliciting the required thinking processes or simplifying 
the underlying computations (Chu & Kita, 2011). 
 To deepen this theory, we will focus on instrumental gestures, i.e. gestures 
whose distinctive effect is to actively facilitate or enhance certain thinking 
processes of the agent, regardless that her gesturing intervenes in solo or 
social tasks. For example, experiments show that subjects free to produce 
gestures perform better in tasks of information recollection (either linguistic, 
using lists of words, as in Goldin-Meadow, 2003, or visuospatial, using dots 
positioned in a grid net, as in Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001 and Wagner et al., 
2004), learning of mathematical problem-solving strategies (Broaders et al., 
2007; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2009), visuomotor transformation (e.g., mental 
rotations, see Chu & Kita 2008, 2011), and visualization for communication 
(Hutchins 2010). In communicative contexts, gesturing helps speaking by 
highlighting perceptually present information for speakers (Alibali & Kita 
2010) and affecting f luency of speech (Rauscher et al., 1996), pauses (Graham 
& Heywood, 1975) and contents (Rimé et al., 1984). 
 How do instrumental gestures facilitate thinking? Crucially, the correlation 
between gesturing and performance increase is neither reducible to an 
incidental association between cognitive processing and behavioral 
production, nor to the transferring of information patterns from linguistic to 
visuo-motor memory: in fact, gestures facilitate problem-solving whether 
verbal information is required or not (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2000; Chu 
& Kita, 2011), and provide rich perceptual-motoric information that can’t be 
found in the accompanying speech (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock 2010); 
moreover, absence of gestures, whether imposed or spontaneous, correlates 
with poorer performances, confirming that the gestural activity can take over 
part of the computational work (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).  
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 This is perfectly illustrated by the experiments with mental rotations, as 
there is evidence that participants use motor simulation to solve the object-
matching task (see Schwartz & Holton, 2000; Wexler et al., 1998; Hegarty, 
2004). The fact that the cognitive facilitation through motor simulation is 
bounded by the specific motor constraints of hand movements (Sekiyama, 
1982) suggests that the problem-solving process is simplified because it is 
partly off loaded to the covert activity of the motor system and the overt activity 
of its motor effectors. The motor simulation can also be implemented by overt 
hand movements, namely hand gestures that simulate the shape of objects or 
their orientation in space in a physically controllable and directly perceivable 
manner, surrogating the covert visualization (in imagination) of the equivalent 
internal models (Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011; Ehrlich, Levine & Goldin-Meadow, 
2006). 
 We endorse a particular interpretation of this conclusion. We assert that 
instrumental gesture is effective in cognitive tasks because it offers a model of 
an action in a virtual space of imaginary performative possibilities, i.e. a motor 
simulation that can be inspected and manipulated to predict the effects of an 
action or postdict its causes. In other words, we define as instrumental 
gestures all gestures that actively facilitate certain thinking processes of the 
agent by representing before him some of his possible actions. The content of 
this representation is actional and embodied in nature, as it provides a motoric 
simulation of the action execution, not a linguistic expression of its conceptual 
meaning: we call this view the Gesture-as-Action-based-Thinking hypothesis 
(GAH). Accordingly, instrumental gestures (“pretending to” rotate an object) 
can work as models of the corresponding goal-oriented actions (actually 
rotating the object) because the former represents the key motoric patterns of 
the latter. At the same time, an instrumental gesture significantly differs from a 
fully-f ledged instantiation of that action: while an instrumental action aims to 
achieve a transformative goal in the physical environment, the gesture aims 
only to display a model of the possible effects associated to such goal. However, 
as a matter of fact, we can recognize actions from the corresponding gestures 
more or less like we identify real objects from their sketches. This analogical 
relation suggests that gestures seem specifically tailored to help some of our 
cognitive operations. 
 That said, one might still wonder why instrumental gesture might be better 
at facilitating thinking than action does (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010). 
Our answer is that GAH can best account for the fact that gestures do not only 
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follow from, but also actively re-shape our problem-solving processes by 
strategically instantiating in f lesh and bones some concretely perceivable 
representation of those very processes. The subject’s performances are 
actually augmented by the fact that gestures, unlike actual actions, are not 
constrained by sensorimotor contingencies, and thus can solicit the 
production of rich representations of virtual possibilities of actions; because 
gesturing allows her to physically embody and directly inspect a perceptual 
representation of the general structure of these virtual possibilities, gestures 
acquire the function to model, complete, speed-up and make more precise her 
own thoughts. Later in our discussion we will show that pointing is a particular 
and significant form of instrumental gesture, one that can successfully 
exemplify how this happens. 
2. Gestures have representational contents 
The distinctive idea of GAH is that instrumental gestures facilitate a subject’s 
thought process by displaying it externally, materially incarnating it in front of 
the subject and, possibly, of other observers, making it available for perceptual 
appreciation and overt (possibly public) consideration. This idea seems in line 
with the psychological definition of a gesture as a 'material carrier’ of meaning 
(Vygotsky 1962), i.e. a physical realization of cognitive activity that has 
systematic effects: by this reason, the “actual motion of the gesture itself is a 
dimension of thinking […], thinking in one of its many forms" (McNeill 2000, 
p.98). 
 Instrumental gestures affect our cognitive operations precisely because, 
while dynamically integrated in the subject’s brain-bodily unfolding (like actual 
actions), they are simultaneously exapted as vehicles of 
representational/symbolic content, i.e. models of virtual actions that gestures 
offer for explicit consideration and manipulation. Experiments can extensively 
document how, with protracted practice, gestures and mental rotation 
capabilities co-vary, generating novel problem-solving patterns. Both the 
frequency and the typology of the produced gestures vary with practice (Chu & 
Kita 2008): while object-movement gestures (representing the movement of 
an object by itself) increase, hand–object interaction gestures (pantomiming 
the agentive hand action on an object) decrease. This suggests that a new 
competence (based on previously unavailable abstract models of manipulation) 
is added to preexisting covert capabilities of mental rotation, and correlates 
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with the gradual internalization of the models of the virtual actions. This 
hypothesis is strengthened by the evidence that verbal description of rotation 
in concurrent speech produces more agent-independent reports over time, and 
that the change of motor strategies is hampered when gestures are prohibited 
(ivi, p. 718). Such evidence confirms that gestures play an active casual role, as 
opposite to a merely expressive one, in solving the task of object matching: 
gestures do not simply explicate fully formed thoughts, they additionally mirror 
(and help complete) thoughts in statu nascendi, substantially contributing to 
shape them throughout their development. 
 Why should this contribution be representational in nature, even if only in 
a minimal sense? Instrumental gestures re-enact pre-specified body schemata 
as vicarious stand-ins for virtual actions or possible states of affairs: if we can 
intuitively differentiate between action and gesture this is precisely because we 
attribute a symbolic content to the latter. Such differentiation is perceptually 
possible because the normative conditions of gestures (the conditions under 
which gestures are successful), differ from the normative conditions of actions: 
an action is performed to accomplish a physical transformation, not to 
represent it; on the contrary, the corresponding gesture intends precisely to 
refer to that transformation, not to achieve it. Gestural movements suggest the 
effects of their corresponding action even if (and – to some extent - exactly 
because) it is evident that the performer doesn’t intend to produce those 
effects: this requires complex capabilities of implicit projection and imaginary 
variation that allow visualizing possible sensorimotor contingencies that the 
gesture indirectly represents in a virtual space, rather than simply observing 
actual sensorimotor contingencies to which its movements would be directly 
adjusting to. 
 Endorsing a similar claim, Hutchins (2010, p. 97) notes that it is by 
bringing online such visualization skills that “gesture depicts a fictional event 
that facilitates reasoning”, either reflexively (in the signaler herself) or 
communicatively (in its interlocutors). And Goldin-Meadow (2003, p. 186) 
asserts that gestures enrich our representational skills, either replicating the 
contents available in verbal format, or supplementing and nuancing them with 
information in the visuomotor format. The cognitive efficacy of gestures as 
overt virtual models is best accounted for by the concept of ‘external 
representation’ (Kirsch, 2010a): not too differently from other 
representational media (instantiated by speech, pictures, drawings, plastic arts, 
or – in a closer proximity with gestures - dance and pantomime), the gestural 
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medium, instantiated by action movements, offers a symbolic content that is 
spatially localized, publicly accessible, and passively (perceptually) affecting 
the observers and the performer herself.  
 With respect to mental rotation tasks, Chu & Kita (2008) documents the 
symbolic function of instrumental gestures, which are not only produced to 
evoke bodily schemata of familiar actions (one-to-one simulation of the action’s 
movements through the gesture’s), but also to represent some increasingly 
general patterns of movement representing the context of the action. The 
model manipulated by the gesture doesn’t need to be a fully-f ledged motor re-
enactement of the set of movements that implement an instrumental action; on 
the contrary, the gesture tends to symbolically exapt those movements to 
reference an entire typology of virtual events or features consistently associated 
to their goals (directions, trajectories, speed, or other general properties of 
objects and actions). 
 The symbolic function of gestures progressively becomes more important 
while the agent becomes more familiar with his gesture-based problem solving 
strategies. This happens in three stages the specific roles of which are 
empirically documented: in the first stage, gestures mimic the actions that 
would have been actually used to manipulate the objects (suffering from 
limitations by both the physical features of the object and the anatomical 
restriction of the body parts). In the second stage, gestures are de-agentivized: 
they don’t reproduce familiar actions, but abstractly model them (body parts, 
especially the hand, represent the object, and the gestural trajectories 
represent the motion of the object). The problem solving strategy is detached: 
it is only limited by the anatomical restriction of the agent’s body, rather than 
by the physical features of the object to be manipulated. In the third stage, the 
skill gained from the first two stages becomes internalized, as no overt bodily 
manipulation or representation is necessary anymore, and problem solving 
improves as it gets free from the limitations imposed by the sensorimotor 
contingencies. Summing up, the visible effects of de-agentivization and 
detachment result in more abstract, self-contained, gestural representations, 
culminating in f luent and efficacious internalization of the action simulation. 
 The gesture’s incremental lack of precise correspondence with actual 
sensorimotor contingencies testifies that the agent is gaining more abstract 
and comprehensive internal models of potential situations (as recognized by 
McNeill, 2000, and recently confirmed by Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010, 
p. 670). The abstract value of the gesture as a virtual model may increase with 
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de-agentivization and detachment, even if the gesture’s resemblance to its 
corresponding goal-oriented actions decreases. Interestingly, de-
agentivization itself follows from the fact that the “inherent instability of motor 
execution may serve as a reservoir for different possible strategies” (Chu & 
Kita 2008, p. 721). Chu & Kita (2011) confirms that spontaneously produced 
gestures help solving spatial visualization problems (mental rotation task and a 
paper folding task); but as the subjects solve more problems, the spatial 
computation supported by gestures becomes internalized, and the gesture 
frequency decreases. The computational facilitation can be generalized to 
similar spatial visualization tasks, and persists even when, in subsequent spatial 
visualization problems, gesture is prohibited. 
 Since our analysis targets only self-affecting gestures (and not, for example, 
attention-getting gestures, emblem gestures, and interactive gestures), it is 
possible to conclude that the specific patterns of similarity/difference between 
such gestures and the corresponding actions characterize their relation as 
functionally dedicated (inherently structured to performance enhancement), 
rather than extrinsic (generally associative): their correspondence serves a 
referential function (i.e., the gesture serves to vicariate the action, not vice 
versa), in that it provides a representational model (i.e., only the gesture, not 
the action, has a content) that enables the manipulation of contextual 
information relevant for facilitating certain cognitive tasks. With regard to the 
similarities between gestures and actions, the gesture of hand rotations overtly 
embodies at least some of the general patterns (motoric, topological, and 
morphological) that would be necessary to actually rotate the objects, even 
without actually needing to fully accomplish this transformation in real space 
(this would prevent the gesture from visualizing the details of the imaginary 
rotations). With regard to the differences, according to the intuition proposed 
by Werner and Kaplan (1963), and later developed by Piaget (1968), in 
development an action can begin to refer to its typical outcome only in virtue of 
some intervening distance (physical and symbolic) between the former and the 
latter (e.g., movements typically involved in a certain form of interaction 
become detached requests for that interaction). Does reference mediated by 
distance/detachment implies representation? There are different opinions on 
this regard. 
 For example, some enactive (anti-representationist) approaches to 
cognition deny that contentful representations are among the constitutive 
components of basic minds (Hutto & Myin, 2012). This claim doesn’t conflict 
132   Humana.Mente – Issue 24 – July 2013 
 
with our representationist approach to instrumental gestures, which accounts 
for advanced, symbolic forms of cognition, rather than basic ones. An (at least 
minimally) representational story seems necessary to account for the 
functional difference between goal-oriented actions and instrumental gestures: 
namely, only instrumental gestures can function as material carriers of 
symbolic thought, as they do not only solicit one’s own thought processes, but 
specifically display them perceptually. While skillful, unreflective goal-
oriented actions fundamentally are motor output adaptively modulated to 
match the perceptual reality, gestures (as well as ritualized embodied routines) 
work also as super-imposed models that actively change the perception of the 
context, transfiguring it into “a readily available problem-solving resource, one 
whose elements restructure the piece-finding problem and thereby reduce the 
information processing load placed on the inner mechanisms in play” 
(Wheeler in press). Representations seem required in that a content/vehicle 
distinction is in place: once they have developed a full symbolic distance from 
the corresponding actions, gestures do not simply re-enact the sensorimotor 
contingencies of those actions, but also invite to withdraw from them, while 
attending to the action context from a relatively detached perspective 
(Cappuccio & Wheeler, 2011; see also McNeil, 2000 p. 156, with reference to 
the Heideggerian account of ‘signs’ developed by Dreyfus, 1994). 
 
3. Pointing: a case for structural de-agentivization and detachment 
It is usually assumed that instrumental gestures can only represent goal-
oriented hand actions, like rotations of three dimensional objects in space. But 
we propose that pointing is also an instrumental gesture, even if apparently it 
doesn’t represent any such hand action. We claim that pointing illustrates very 
well how a gesture can enhance our thinking processes because the symbolic 
contents made available by it happen to facilitate certain cognitive tasks. Why 
is pointing an instrumental gesture? And what is it an instrument for? 
 Consider the extreme case of “abstract deictic gestures, which point to a 
seemingly empty location in front of the speaker or move as if to track a moving 
object” (McNeill 2000, p. 170). These gestures “could be related to the ability 
to orient our body parts (e.g., gaze and the hand) toward a target in the physical 
environment, and to the ability to track the target when it moves.” According to 
Kita (2000, 170-171), pointing provides a peculiar case for GAH because, 
even if it doesn’t need an “obvious enactment component” (i.e., it doesn’t aim 
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to produce direct physical manipulation of the external reality, like other 
instrumental gestures), it is “also formed by spatio-motoric thinking” (it re-
configures the subjective spatial perception and the attentional state of both 
the producer and of the observers). Index-finger pointing has a prototypical 
function as an embodied vehicle of externalized, symbolic representation. The 
representational content conveyed by pointing is fundamentally twofold.  
 Primarily, it conveys geometrical information on gaze direction, i.e. a 
model of a virtual agent’s system of attentional/ocular fixation/orientation 
(Cappuccio & Shepherd, 2013; Shepherd & Cappuccio, 2012). This view is in 
line with the individualistic accounts of the ontogenesis of pointing (Vygotsky 
1962, Bates 1975), and is corroborated by the studies suggesting that the first 
instances of pointing are manifestations of the child’s own attention during 
tactile exploration of close-by objects, and that only subsequently this gesture 
becomes social in its use, while infants become gradually aware of the 
responses given to this action by the adults (Carpendale & Carpendale 2010). 
By pointing, the agent maps the abstract information on her gaze/attention 
into the set of performative hand-based and postural motor skills that 
concretely allow her to align finger, hand, arm, torso and whole-body with the 
orientation of her eyes, hence facilitating future actions on the target. Through 
this mechanism, the pointing subject himself can look into the direction 
indicated by his own pointing finger. This situation invites him to split his 
attention between a certain direction and, simultaneously, the index finger 
(signifier) that symbolizes attention towards the very same direction: this 
division is also a duplication of the concrete pointing subject into an agent who 
looks while looking at himself looking. Pointing is a symbolic replay (a 
predictive/postdictive model) of gaze and posture direction that refers to the 
very action of gazing while being categorically irreducible to it: this distance is 
structural because an index finger can replicate the visual orientation of the 
eyes but obviously, unlike the eyes, doesn’t produce its own sense of vision. Its 
function is parallel to but incommensurably different from looking and, 
therefore, inherently abstract. In the virtual space drawn by pointing, the 
index-finger extension acts as a virtual stand-in that informs the observers 
(including the signaler himself) of the mere possibility of a certain direction of 
sight, implicitly inviting them to align their gaze accordingly.  
 Secondarily, the representational content conveyed by pointing 
encompasses also the symbolic meaning that is associated to the designated 
object for the fact that the signaler intentionally highlights it (Bruner 1983). 
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Pointing is one of children’s first symbolizing devices in the “joint attentional 
frame” described by Tomasello (1999). The signaler’s attention is not only 
incidentally communicated by his eye direction, it is also intentionally 
represented by his pointing finger. The signaler’s attentional state affects the 
subjective perception of the indicated target in all the recipients that are aware 
of the signaler’s pointing and can understand its declarative intention, 
recognizing in this target a focus of joint attention and symbolic 
representation. The intersubjective meaning of this common focus is actively 
modified by the very act of declarative pointing on the basis of the common 
ground of skills, knowledge, and cooperative goals that the co-attenders share: 
e.g., an empty chair can be highlighted as either a symbol of the person who 
usually sits on it or as an invitation to sit on it, depending on the contextually 
relevant information that the co-attenders share; a physical location in the 
ecological space of situated agents is transfigured into a formal indicator of a 
position detached by them, and identified by a metric system of geometric 
coordinates. 
 Therefore, the instrumental action that pointing represents is primarily the 
motor action of ocular re-orientation that targets a certain point in space, and 
secondarily the imaginary affordances associated to that point on the basis of 
the background information shared by the signaler and the co-attenders. Its 
goal is to realign the co-attenders’ perceptual field and allow them (including 
the signaler herself) to see the world under “a different angle”, either in a 
strictly sensorial sense (update the visual perspective, moving the eyes to a new 
perceivable target) or in a symbolic one (update the associated imaginative 
content, modifying its representational meaning in function of the joint 
attention established between co-attenders). 
 Now, in a communicative scenario, one can solicit a co-attender to bring an 
object by pointing at it; but, while dealing alone with the physical reality, one 
cannot displace an object by simply pointing at it with his finger. Like other 
instrumental gestures, pointing can’t be used to directly manipulate or 
physically transform any object; additionally, unlike other instrumental 
gestures, also the action that it represents does not aim to produce physical 
transformation/manipulation: the “eye-action” for which pointing stands in 
(ocular re-orientation, either voluntary or automatic through saccadic 
movements) is essentially observational in nature. Another important 
difference between pointing and the other gestures is that a simple vector with 
a fixed dimension is sufficient to represent the eye-action in a schematic form 
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via pointing, while the complexity of the hand-actions represented by the other 
gestures involve a high number of degrees of freedom. The non-manipulative, 
vector-representing function of pointing makes this gesture one of the most 
paradigmatic cases of GAH: unlike other instrumental gestures, pointing 
doesn’t just occasionally produce the effects of de-agentivization and 
detachment; on the contrary, it structurally relies on them to produce its 
indicative function. Pointing specifically serves to indicate objects in the extra-
personal space and highlight them as symbolic referents in a potentially 
contemplative, virtually detached dimension, not as poles of real actions 
affording immediate manipulation in a practical dimension.  
4. Neuroscience and phenomenology of pointing 
Neurofunctional data (see Ulloa and George, this journal issue) suggest that 
pointing gestures and eye gaze elicit similar attentional responses (Langton & 
Bruce, 2000), and share a basis of information instantiated by common 
neuronal structures, mainly the superior temporal sulcus (Sato et al., 2009). 
This is significant in relation to the distinction between peripersonal and 
extrapersonal space (the spatial dimension targeted by pointing), as we know 
that the perception of peripersonal space is modulated by the vocabulary of 
motor actions mapped in the premotor areas (Rizzolatti et al., 1988), while the 
extra-personal space is mainly mapped by intraparietal areas related to gaze 
direction and attention fixation: that is why the manipulation of extrapersonal 
space “is mainly subserved by oculomotor circuits, in which spatial information 
arises from neurons whose receptive fields are coded in retinal coordinates” 
(Neppi-Mòdona et al., 2007). 
  This neurofunctional dissociation reflects the different behavioral and 
experiential significance of far and near space, which respectively correspond 
to the domains of contemplative and manipulative actions. Both 
neuropsychological (Milner and Goodale 2006) and phenomenological (Kelly, 
2001) accounts have stressed the functional differentiation between pointing 
and goal-oriented hand actions such as reaching for grasping, theorizing that 
they are controlled by two autonomous cognitive architectures (“ways of 
vision”, or “ways to see” according to Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003) respectively 
dedicated to the semantic and pragmatic modalities of spatial processing: on 
the one hand, a “vision for perception”, encoding metric coordinates 
(objective distances), and representational in character (decoupled from 
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immediate interaction and regulated by agent-neutral, context-independent 
geometrical norms); on the other hand, a “vision for action”, adaptively 
responsive to motor opportunities embedded in practical contexts, and 
dispositional in character. A precursor to this view can be found in Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of perception (1945), which builds on a famous 
neuropsychological case studied by Goldstein and Gelb (1918): according to 
these classical studies, pointing exploits the first way of vision, because it 
requires spatial information encoded in terms of positions to transfigure the 
target objects into stand-ins for symbolic reference and detached 
representation; manipulative hand-action processes exploit the other way of 
vision, because they need spatial information in terms of operative situations to 
respond to ecological affordances by means of pre-reflective embodied skills. 
 One of the crucial differences at stake is that the representational/symbolic 
contents play a defining role only for the positional organization of space, and 
don’t have any evident weight in motor intentional behaviors familiarly 
produced by skilled agents in a space of situation (Kelly 2002). Only the 
former involves attentive consideration of the distance - both physical and 
symbolic - that separates the subject and the object of the action: while objects 
in the peripersonal space pre-reflectively afford possible hand-actions that are 
familiar to the agent in terms of practical know-how, objects referenced in the 
extrapersonal space via pointing principally invite contemplative awareness of 
the bare fact that they are objectively present. This representational and 
symbolic function of pointing invites two or more co-attenders to establish a 
particular attentional structure, as previously remarked: it highlights the 
indicated target as a focus of interest for their joint attention and factual 
knowledge (common ground), rather than as a usable object affording 
immediate manipulation.  
 It seems clear that pointing does have a representational content like other 
instrumental gestures; but is this sufficient to include pointing in the set of 
instrumental gestures (like hand rotations), in accord with GAH? Two 
objections might be deployed to resist this inclusion. The first intends to show 
that the format of the representational content of pointing is linguistic, rather 
than motoric/actional; the latter that pointing doesn’t have any 
representational content at all. In particular, the first objection contends that, 
because the function of pointing is often associated to language, the meaning 
of the indicated objects is highlighted by the speech that accompanies the 
gesture. If this is true, then a symbolic meaning can be conveyed by pointing 
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through the linguistic system alone, without involving the simulation of 
actions. The second objection contends that, unlike other gestures, a pointing 
index finger does not have any representational function in that it does not 
serve to simulate any manipulative or goal-oriented action.  
 Were these objections correct, pointing would be just a communicative, 
non-instrumental gesture; it could definitely affect the communicative context, 
but it would never play an active role in externalizing or enhancing the agent’s 
thinking processes. Pointing wouldn’t be a legitimate instance of GAH: it 
would hardly provide any representational contribution to non-linguistic tasks 
and, even if it did, its symbolic meaning wouldn’t obtain from the 
representation of a motor action, as our hypothesis requires. But it seems that 
the assumptions supporting both objections are false: against the first 
objection, we stress that pointing is a form of re-enactment that actively creates 
or discloses new linguistic meanings, rather than passively mapping pre-
existing linguistic meanings into the available indicated objects; against the 
second objection, we note that it is impossible to appropriately model the 
representational, content-productive function of pointing without recognizing 
that this gesture is a virtual re-enactement of a particular kind of motor action, 
i.e. eye movements whose goal consists exactly in controlling the 
observational, non-manipulative function of gazing behavior. 
5. The role of pointing for language acquisition is constitutive, not derived  
To respond to the first objection, we remark that - even if pointing largely 
occurs in communicative contexts, and is often accompanied by speech - its 
primary function can exist independently of both language and communication 
in general. On the contrary, pointing seems more of a precursor of language, 
and an important one, because it scaffolds joint attention in both development 
and evolution. Such coordination of attention is a way into declarative 
communication, not only its outcome (as suggested by the evidence that 
gestures facilitate speakers highlighting perceptually present information, see 
Alibali & Kita, 2010). On the other hand, language could hardly mature a 
conventionalized semantics without the mediation of a f lexible and universal 
deictic designator of objects and actions, such as pointing: in development, 
reduction of pointing frequency is a symptom for the diagnose of severe 
impairments of communicative and social capabilities (American Psychiatric 
Association 1994); in evolution, non-verbal deixis did not derive from verbal 
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deixis, but plausibly played a role in the acquisition of both joint attention and 
language (Leavens, Racine, & Hopkins, 2009). Without an appropriate triadic 
attentional scaffold that allows reciprocity, mutual knowledge, and nomination 
of individual objects, communication remains confined to asymmetric, 
affective, audience under-specified, vocalizations and bodily signals (Shepherd 
& Cappuccio, 2013, building on Tomasello, 2008). Pointing is one of the 
animal communicative signals with the highest potential to motivate this 
transition (Cappuccio & Shepherd, 2012). 
 Hence, pointing’s function can’t be linguistic at root because it precedes 
and sustains the very acquisition of language, scaffolding nomination in joint 
attention experiences that symbolically unite visual and vocal cues. This way, 
pointing highlights external representational contents (the objects that it 
makes publicly salient for mutual consideration, either in perception or in 
imagination) and makes them available as shared linguistic objects. Pointing 
contributes to nomination, but – like other gestures - it is also consistently 
produced in non-linguistic contexts to draw virtual objects in an imaginary 
space and help individual or shared cognitive processes related to symbolic 
visualization, memorization, and manipulation. For example, according to 
Hutchins (2005, 1567-68), the Micronesian navigators used to point to the 
stars to fixate the memory of an imaginary map of their travel, mentally 
superimposing certain key locations on the spatial landmarks provided by the 
star points. This way, highlighting the position of the stars as material anchors, 
the navigator “creates a model of the voyage that he can see and manipulate 
from his point of view on the deck of the canoe”. In a rather similar way, 
according to Kirsh (2010b) Irish river dancers and choreographers use their 
hands and gestures, and occasionally pointing-like finger movements, to mark 
well-defined positions and iconically represent certain dancing steps during 
rehearsal: using their gestures as a small-scale replica of their full-body 
movements, they “create a simplified or abstracted version – a model” of the 
dance phrases they have to perform. In these cases, whether gestures are 
accompanied by speech or not, their role is to reorganize the representation of 
the physical space, transposing the relevant spatial cues from a situational to a 
positional framework. 
 This re-organization, highlighting relevant objects of individual or shared 
interests, and setting up a hierarchy of perspectively oriented levels of 
relevance in the perceptual experience, might become serviceable to associate 
pointed objects and linguistic contents, and fixate linguistic and social norms 
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in either private or public memory. This is consistent with the view that 
gestures don’t simply accompany, but also affect different aspects of linguistic 
production (Graham & Heywood, 1975; Rimé et al., 1984; Rauscher et al., 
1996). If gestures can sustain language production this is probably because 
they may also have a non-linguistic function, in line with the Information 
Packaging Hypothesis: 
the process of informational organization is helped by representational 
gestures. It is helped because the production of representational gestures 
involves a different kind of thinking (namely, spatio-motoric thinking) from the 
default thinking for speaking (namely, analytic thinking). Spatio-motoric 
thinking provides alternative organizings of information that are not readily 
accessible via analytic thinking […] The Information Packaging Hypothesis 
stipulates that what generates a gesture is spatio-motoric thinking, which has a 
raison d’être independent of speaking. Consequently, it is expected that 
gestures and speech have a certain degree of independence from each other 
(Kita, 2000, pp. 166-170). 
Even before or without accompanying speech, pointing holds an important 
function in reorganizing our thoughts. 
 
6. Pointing doesn’t only produce, but represents gaze coordination 
To respond to the second objection, we stress that pointing is a gesture with a 
peculiar representational function: namely, it doesn’t represent immediate 
manipulative effects in the physical world, but attention-states and knowledge-
states (including those of the agent who points). This is particularly evident in 
the declarative/informative use of pointing, when its expected communicative 
effects primarily depends on sharing some specific symbolic content, i.e. the 
common knowledge that the co-attenders share (Tomasello 2008). 
 Consider well-formed instances of declarative/informative pointing that 
successfully align the signaler’s and the recipient’s gaze direction: they do not 
only bring about actual coordination of attention between the signaler and the 
recipient(s), they concurrently impose a perceptually vivid and immediately 
shared representation of the very situation of coordination that they bring 
about. In other words, declarative/informative pointing is not just a strong 
visual stimulus to coordinate attention, but also one that symbolically 
represents the fact that attention is actively being coordinated by it (for a 
thorough analysis, see Cappuccio and Shepherd 2013, building on the concept 
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of “self-involving situations” of joint attention proposed by Peacock 2005). 
This happens because pointing is not just an ostensive signal (one that displays 
a certain communicative intention, like other natural signals), but also a self-
ostensive one. It is a very peculiar signal that represents its intention to display 
a certain communicative intention, thus stressing its declarative valence.  
 What is the specific representational contribution that pointing offers for 
cognitive self-stimulation (i.e., augmentation of one’s own attentional and 
perceptual processes) processes? Since pointing vicariates the signaler’s gaze 
direction and represents it in front of her, its primary representational function 
is to make visible in a stylized symbolic format what couldn’t be otherwise 
visible to oneself in a pre-symbolic context: one’s own eyes. This is how 
pointing scaffolds and speeds-up our processes of attention re-direction and 
fixation by actively representing them in front of us, not unlike other 
instrumental gestures do. Since ocular movements are legitimate actions, 
having the goal to re-direct vision and solicit attention shifts, it is true that 
there exists a goal-oriented action of which pointing is a symbolic model. 
However, such action is eye-based, not hand-based, and has contemplation as 
its goal, not physical manipulation. Additionally, often pointing is produced 
not only for the sake of controlling one’s own attention, but concurrently to 
offer a public, openly visible, and socially effective representation of it that is 
symmetrically accessible by all the observers and simultaneously affect them: a 
“triadic virtual agent”, a pre-formed template for gaze coordination and 
cooperation that, through development, is progressively employed to initiate 
the situation of joint attention according to the general model of ontogenetic 
ritualization (Tomasello, 1999). 
 However, it is crucial that also when aiming at social interaction pointing 
doesn’t simply serve to directly produce gaze coordination, but also to modify 
the rich meaning of the very social context in which gaze coordination 
intervenes (Shepherd, 2010). Through pointing, the signaler enjoys the 
opportunity to manipulate not only the co-attender’s gaze direction, but also 
her imagination, by displaying a symbolic model of their joint attention towards 
an object of common knowledge. This allows an infant to request symbolic 
forms of engagement in joint attention that are crucial for the acquisition of 
complex narratives and mentalistic skills through the feedback provided by the 
caregivers (Franco & Butterworth, 1996). 
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7. Pointing helps us think 
Pointing is sufficient to modify the pointer’s spatial perception and attention, 
and this explains why this gesture can and actually is employed in an 
instrumental way: to represent certain cognitive processes in order to monitor 
them and enhance them. Two experimental studies focusing on counting skills 
confirm that pointing primarily plays an instrumental role in facilitating 
numerical thinking, and that this facilitation relies on an actional competence, 
not a linguistic one: Alibali and DiRusso (1999) found that pointing gestures 
help children link sets of objects to their corresponding number words (when 
counting "one" "two" "three", etc.); Carlson et al., (2007) showed that 
adults are faster and more accurate in counting when they can point. The first 
study suggests that pointing plays a constitutive role, not just an expressive 
one, in articulating the early developments of analytic, attentional/perceptual, 
and linguistic operations: therefore it doesn’t presuppose, but actively 
scaffolds the visuo-spatial manipulation of the corresponding 
linguistic/analytic contents. The second study suggests that the nature of this 
scaffold essentially relates to the motoric enactment of the pointing gesture: 
simple sequential fixation of the objects to be counted doesn’t grant the same 
performances that are achieved when fixation is concurrently represented as an 
explicit symbol in front of the subject through his own index finger. 
 A notable aspect of this dynamic is that the pointing subject can reflectively 
control his own attentional processes through a duplicate of his ongoing 
observational activity. Pointing hence represents a stand-in for the 
corresponding series of acts of ocular redirection; the benefits received from 
monitoring these acts affect capabilities such keeping track of what has been 
counted, individuating objects, focusing on a particular object, anchoring 
number words to objects, with overall increased command of the abilities to 
visualize, double-check, re-organize, concentrate, and parse in time/space the 
task of counting.  
 Different hypotheses could explain why this facilitation occurs. A 
promising hypothesis is that the process of counting is not enhanced by the 
mere perception of the pointing finger, but also by the execution of its motor 
schema in correspondence with the observation of the counted object. 
Therefore, even without visual and proprioceptual feedback (even without 
perceiving one’s own finger), the activation of the motor programs related to 
the relevant skills could be sufficient to encode the counted objects in first 
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person body coordinates, facilitating the representation of their position in a 
manner that is easier to remember and manipulate. This possibility seems more 
than plausible, as two reports confirm that the motor programs for finger 
movements stored in the pre-motor cortex play an active role in counting tasks: 
a TMS study (Sato et al., 2007) correlates the excitability of hand muscles with 
representation of numerals; and a fMRI study (Tschentscher et al., 2011) shows 
that the motor system activations during mental counting are consistent with 
individual finger counting habits, and suggests an “intrinsic functional link 
between finger counting and number processing”. Evidence of blind-born 
infants who spontaneously accompany their speech with pointing in abstract 
space (Iverson et al., 2000) suggests that these motor routines are consistently 
organized and fully operative early, in human development, and can be elicited 
regardless of the lack of visual feedback. 
 Is it possible that the performative-motor competence of pointing, more 
than the subject’s perception of her own index finger, affects the perception of 
what pointing shows, loading it with a new symbolic meaning? This hypothesis 
seems in accord with Arbib (2005), which proposes that human embodied 
communication (gesture, pantomime, dance) derives its representational 
power from an advanced (human-specific) version of the “mirror system” that 
matches observed gestures with familiarly executed actions. It is significant 
that representational gestures have been associated to activity in the brain area 
where the mirror neuron system is located (for reviews see Cartmill et al., 
2012; Willems & Hagoort, 2007): a subject internally simulates a model of the 
action that corresponds to the gesture he is observing; therefore – building on 
his actual motor expertise - he can immediately recognize the meaning of the 
represented action goal even if the pantomimed movements don’t achieve any 
actual goal. This implies that motor competences (motor schemata of familiar 
actions) can be actively reused not only for intention understanding and action-
goal recognition, but also for symbolic interpretation of imitational 
performances and pantomimic communication. 
 If Arbib’s hypothesis is correct (regardless of its evolutionary ramifications) 
then also index pointing - like other instrumental gestures, and pantomime – 
might convey to its recipients a representational content that is always motoric 
and never just linguistic in nature. Such content is represented by the 
observing subject because, while he observes the instrumental gesture of 
pointing (possibly his own pointing), he mentally simulates in a virtual space 
the corresponding instrumental action of gaze/attention fixation and eye-
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head-posture re-configuration. This motor information might be fused with or 
mapped into the motor information necessary to produce finger-hand-arm-
torso coordination in pointing: if this is the case, then the simulation of 
attention redirection is triggered by the very recognition of the agent’s 
intention to point with the finger towards a distal target, and could work – for 
the observer (including the agent himself) - as a symbolic model that facilitates 
the recognition of any similar attentional redirection, the prediction of its 
effects, or the postdiction of its motivations.  
 It is perhaps too early to claim that an internal simulation of this kind 
mediates these cognitive tasks. But there is empirical evidence that the 
neuronal circuits in lateral intraparetial area dedicated to ocular redirection are 
recruited both for controlling one’s ocular movements and for recognizing 
similar movements in the others’, and that their causal contribution actively 
facilitates gaze following (Shepherd et al 2009). In other words, we know that 
the motor programs sub-serving ocular saccades, gaze orientation, and 
attention fixation, contribute to recognizing and interpreting the others’ gaze 
behavior, discriminating among different social variables, and facilitating gaze 
following behaviors and attention coordination. If these motor programs were 
activated during the observation or production of pointing, this would suggest 
that the recognition of this gesture is accompanied by an internal simulation of 
the ocular movements in the direction indicated by pointing. This possibility 
seems plausible because the recognition of the direction of attention is 
partially processed by the same structures whether the direction is expressed 
by eyes or gestures: gaze shifts, arrows, and pointing fingers produce similar 
activations in the superior temporal sulcus area, and elicit similar brain 
activation in parietal, frontal, and occipital cortices (Sato et al., 2009; Materna 
et al., 2008). 
8. Conclusions 
Finger pointing significantly exemplifies how a gesture can modify an agent’s 
spatial/perceptual experience, and enhance elements of his cognitive 
performance, even when it doesn’t symbolize any physical manipulation. The 
cognitive benefits produced by the pointing gesture do not consist in 
anticipating the physical effects of a manipulative action (as in hand-rotations), 
but the consequences of the overall reconfiguration of the agent’s posture, 
gaze orientation, and attentional attitude. This anticipation modifies her 
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spatial experience and projects a symbolic meaning on it: by means of this 
reconfiguration, pointing draws a virtual line between far (observational) and 
near (interactional) space, and allows the subject to perceive the surrounding 
objects in a detached way, for example highlighting their intrinsic properties of 
being countable, or anchored to objective positions in an imaginary map. 
Subsequently, it can invite spatial reference, nomination, or visual imagination 
in the intersubjective space of position shared by the co-attenders who engage 
in joint attention.  
 It is at least in principle possible that in all these cases, and probably in 
others, the relevant action models manipulated by the pointing subject to 
facilitate his cognitive task are not only derived from the perception of the 
pointing gesture that he produced, but also from a concurrent simulation of 
the corresponding eye movements, mediated by the mirror neurons for gaze 
direction in the lateral intraparetial area. So, while a subject is intentionally 
pointing to help himself in a task of counting, or in anchoring a particular 
position to a mental map, it is possible that he is exploiting an internal 
simulation of his own gaze redirection. This allows him to project a particular 
valence (for example declarative/informative) to this gesture: 
phenomenologically, he doesn’t simply fixate an object, he also actively 
dedicate his attention to the very fact that he is fixating it, explicitly and 
reflectively controlling his focus of attention. This might produce a qualitative 
reconfiguration of the spatial and bodily experience associated to attentional 
fixation toward a certain position/object targeted by the eyes, loading this very 
experience with symbolic meanings that are not reducible to direct perception. 
This is possible because we know that the internal structures recruited for the 
interpretation of the others’ eye directions don’t work in isolation, but tune 
their simulation function with the overall embodied and social background of 
one’s experience.  
 GAH is a comprehensive and efficacious model to account for both the 
differences and the correlations between goal-oriented actions and 
instrumental gestures, and to explain the beneficial role that instrumental 
gestures play in cognitive tasks; we have argued that pointing is a particular 
case accounted for by this model, one that manifestly shows how the cognitive 
benefits of instrumental gestures do not always necessarily depend on 
representing physical manipulation. 
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